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Abstract
A standard two-sector sticky price model with flexibly priced durables depicts nega-
tive co-movement between durables and non-durables after a monetary policy shock,
which is at odds with the empirical evidence. This paper proposes a new channel, non-
separable preferences with a small wealth effect on labor hours, as a solution to the
co-movement puzzle. In contrast to the standard model where the aggregate hours re-
main relatively unchanged after the contractionary policy shock, aggregate labor hours
fall along with the fall in the labor wage, thereby discouraging production in both the
durable and non-durable goods sectors. We further compare our model’s explanatory
power with two other alternatives that can resolve the puzzle by using a Bayesian
approach. Based on the log marginal likelihood and cross-correlation function com-
parison exercises, we find evidence that the data strongly favor both the alternative
specifications over our baseline model. More specifically, the model with a working
capital channel and habit formation gives the best fit to the data, especially for cross-
correlations between durable and non-durable consumption.
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1 Introduction
Erceg and Levin (2006), using a VAR approach, documented that expenditures on both
durable and non-durable goods decrease after a contractionary policy shock. Standard New
Keynesian models with different price setting behaviors in the durable and non-durable goods
sectors have failed to replicate this result. In particular, with a flexibly-priced durable goods
sector, a contractionary monetary policy shock leads to a decrease in non-durables but an
increase in durable goods production, leaving the aggregate production unchanged. This
co-movement puzzle is first pointed out by Barsky, House and Kimball (2003, 2007, BHK
hereafter).
We propose a new mechanism, namely, non-separable (in consumption and leisure) pref-
erences with a small wealth effect on labor hours as a possible solution to the puzzle. By
incorporating these preferences in the standard BHK setting, we find that outputs across
sectors are able to comove after a monetary policy shock. Furthermore, by introducing in-
ternal habit formation in non-durable consumption, we can generate high interest-elasticity
in durable output relative to non-durable output as in the data. Next, we estimate our
model using Bayesian techniques and the estimated model’s predictions are consistent with
our intuition. Finally, using log marginal likelihood, we compare our model’s fit with two
competing alternative model specifications in the literature that can resolve the puzzle in
isolation. The out-of-sample forecasts indicate that the data strongly support both the al-
ternatives over our model.
The preferences adopted here is first proposed by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman
(1998, GHH hereafter), who induce a zero wealth effect on labor supply. In the past two
decades, these preferences have been widely employed in resolving famous puzzles based on
US and international data. For example, GHH demonstrated that these preferences act as a
possible channel to induce positive co-movement between output, consumption, and invest-
ment after an investment-specific technology shock, which standard preferences have failed
to do. Raffo (2007, 2009) identify the potential for these preferences in explaining many
key features of international business cycles. Monacelli and Perotti (2008) show that these
preferences can bring about a rise in consumption and the real wage after a positive gov-
ernment spending shock that is consistent with their VAR estimates. Recently, Jaimovich
and Rebelo (2009) have introduced generalized GHH preferences that can generate positive
co-movement amongst major macroeconomic aggregates after a positive news shock to fu-
ture productivity. In this paper, we investigate the role of augmented GHH preferences in
reconciling a standard two-sector model’s prediction with the empirical VAR counterparts.
In addition to our proposed solution, the existing literature provides several mechanisms
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which can resolve the co-movement puzzle.1 In particular, we compare our benchmark model
with GHH preferences with two existing models given by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006) and
Tsai (2010). Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006) introduce nominal wage stickiness in the stan-
dard model of BHK. Sticky wages induce price stickiness in durables, giving durable goods
producers less incentive to adjust prices after a contractionary monetary policy shock. This
leads to a decline in durable goods production along with non-durable goods production,
resolving the co-movement puzzle. Tsai (2010) solves the puzzle by incorporating a work-
ing capital channel and habit formation in non-durable consumption. After a contractionary
monetary policy shock, production cost rises due to the working capital channel, leading to a
fall in both durable and non-durable goods production. The consumption growth smoothing
motive implied by habit formation further dampens the response of non-durable production
after the shock. Similar to his paper, the mechanism suggested by our paper can solve the
co-movement puzzle without directly or indirectly inducing price stickiness in the durable
goods sector. Separately and more recently, Kim and Katayama (2011) also propose the
non-separable preference as a possible solution for the co-movement problem. However, our
approach is different from theirs in two ways. First, their specification of preferences is dif-
ferent from ours and, secondly our paper provides systematic evaluation across models that
can resolve the co-movement puzzle using a full information econometric strategy.
With separable preferences, due to the low depreciation rate of durables, the shadow
value for durables remains relatively constant following transitory shocks, which induces
aggregate labor hours and thus aggregate production to remain nearly constant. Thus, a
decline in non-durable goods production after a contractionary monetary policy shock must
be offset by an increase in durable goods production, giving rise to the co-movement puzzle.
By contrast, aggregate hours fall along with the fall in the labor wage under non-separable
GHH preferences, discouraging production in both the durable and non-durable goods sec-
tors. This makes it possible for both durable and non-durable goods production to fall
simultaneouly on impact, thereby resolving the co-movement puzzle.
This paper is also related to the growing literature on the estimation of general equi-
librium models using Bayesian techniques that systematically evaluate the importance of
various shocks and frictions in causing business cycle fluctuations.2 Using these techniques
we find that our estimated model with intermediate habit persistence and the two alterna-
1Other seminal work includes Kitamura and Takamura (2010) who address the issue by incorporating
sticky information in the standard BHK setting; Levin and Yun (2011) who consider the role of incom-
plete financial markets; and Sudo (2008) who presents an input-outut model, where non-durables act an
intermediate inputs for durable production and vice-versa.
2Please see Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010), Lubik and
Schorfheide (2006), and Rabanal and Tuesta (2010).
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tive specifications can simultaneously make outputs in both sectors comove and induce high
interest sensitivity in durables compared to non-durables after a monetary policy shock as
in the data.
Finally, the Bayesian approach allows us to engage in a formal comparison between our
model and two competing alternatives. Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2004)
show that model comparisons, based on marginal likelihood, are consistent even when the
models are misspecified. Rabanal and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2005) estimate and compare four
versions of a sticky price New Keynesian model using Euro data. Another paper by Ichiue,
Kurozumi and Sunakawa (2008) studies the role of an extensive margin in inflation dynamics
by estimating and comparing three alternative models of labor adjustments. Following their
approach, we compute each model’s marginal likelihood in order to compare their explana-
tory power. We find that both of the competing alternatives outperform our benchmark
model in fitting the data. In particular, the data strongly favor Tsai (2010) over all other
specifications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present our model in Section 2 and
the calibration results in Section 3. Section 4 presents the alternative models and Section
5 estimates the models. Section 6 discuss the results and compares the benchmark model
with other alternatives, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
Our model is based on the framework developed in BHK (2007), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006)
and Tsai (2010). There are three types of agents in this economy: households, firms, and the
monetary authority. We modify their models by incorporating GHH preferences. Households
derive utility from the consumption of non-durable goods, durable goods and leisure. On the
production side, there are two sectors: durable and non-durable goods sectors. In each sector,
there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate firms, each producing a
differentiated product. We describe their optimal behaviors as below.
2.1 Households
In every period, the representative household supplies labor (Lt), and chooses nondurable
consumption (Ct), a durable consumption stock (Dt), and a geometric average of current
and past consumption composite levels (Ht) to maximize expected lifetime utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtgtU(Ct, Ct−1, Dt, Dt−1, Lt, Ht)
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where β is the discount factor, and gt is the intertemporal preference shock that follows an
AR(1) process:
gt = ρ
ggt−1 + η
g
t (2.1.1)
where ηgt ∼ N(0, σg) and U(Ct, Ct−1, Dt, Dt−1, Lt, Ht) is the augmented Jaimovich and Rebelo
(2009) utility function that takes the form
U(Ct, Ct−1, Dt, Dt−1, Lt, Ht) =[
(ψc (Ct − hbCt−1)
ρ−1
ρ + (1− ψc)dt (Dt − hbDt−1)
ρ−1
ρ )
ρ
ρ−1 − ltφL1+νt Ht
]1−σ
1− σ
where σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, hb is the habit persistence, ψc is the
weight of nondurable goods in the household’s consumption composite, ρ is the elasticity
of substitution between durable and nondurable consumption, ν is the inverse of the Frisch
labor supply elasticity, and lt is the intratemporal preference shock, also known as the labor
supply shock, which has the following law of motion:
lt = ρ
llt−1 + η
l
t (2.1.2)
where ηlt ∼ N(0, σl). Also, dt is the durable preference shock which has the following law of
motion:
dt = ρ
ddt−1 + η
d
t (2.1.2)
where ηdt ∼ N(0, σd). The presence of Ht makes preferences time non-separable in a con-
sumption composite of durables and non-durables and hours worked. The law of motion for
Ht is
Ht =
[
(ψc (Ct − hbCt−1)
ρ−1
ρ + (1− ψc) (Dt − hbDt−1)
ρ−1
ρ )
ρ
ρ−1
](γ)
H1−γt−1 (2.1.3)
where γ ∈ (0, 1).
A representative household enters period t with initial bond holdings of St−1, receives
wage income, WtLt, profits, Πt, and government transfers, Tt, and purchases non-durable
goods, Pc,tCt, durable goods, Px,tXt, and a risk free bond,
St
Rt
. The household’s budget
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constraint is
Pc,tCt + Px,tXt + Px,t
[
1
2
φ1
(Xt − δDt−1)2
Dt−1
]
≤ WtNt +
∑
j=c,x
Rj,tuj,tK¯j,t
+ Πt + Tt + St−1 − St
Rt
−
∑
j=c,x
Pj,ta(uj,t)K¯j,t, t = 0, 1, .. (1)
and the law of motion for durable goods consumption is
Dt = (1− δ)Dt−1 +Xt,
where S−1 and D−1 are given and δ is the depreciation rate. Rj,t, Kj,t and uj,t are the rental
rate of capital, productive capital stock and variable capital utilization rate in each sector
j = c, x. Hence, the capital services in each sector is given by Kj,t = uj,tK¯j,t. The cost
of setting the capital utilization rate is given by a(uj,t) which is increasing and convex in
uj,t. We assume u¯j = 1, a(1) = 0. Also, the parameter χ governs the elasticity of capital
utilization and is given by χ = a
′′(1)
a′(1) .
By letting Bt =
[
ψc (Ct − hbCt−1)
ρ−1
ρ + (1− ψc)dt (Dt − hbDt−1)
ρ−1
ρ
] ρ
ρ−1
and Vt = [Bt −
ltφL
1+ν
t Ht], the first-order conditions from the household optimization problem are:
Λt = ψc
g
tV
−σ
t B
1
ρ
t C
−1
ρ
t + λtγB
ρ(γ−1)+1
ρ
t ψcC
−1
ρ
t H
1−γ
t−1 (2.1.5)
λt + 
g
t 
l
tV
−σ
t φL
1+ν
t = βEtλt+1(1− γ)Bγt+1H−γt (2.1.6)
gt 
l
tV
−σ
t φ(1 + ν)L
ν
tHt = Λt
Wt
Pc,t
(2.1.7)
Λt
Px,t
Pc,t
= gtV
−σ
t B
1
ρ
t ψdD
−1
ρ
t + λtγB
ρ(γ−1)+1
ρ
t ψdD
−1
ρ
t H
(1−γ)
t−1 + βEt(1− δ)Λt+1
Px,t+1
Pc,t+1
(2.1.8)
Λt
Pc,t
= βEt
[
Λt+1
Rt
Pc,t+1
]
(2.1.9)
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Here λt and Λt represent the Lagrangian multipliers for constraints (2.1.3) and (2.1.4), re-
spectively. Equation (2.1.5) represents the marginal utility of non-durable consumption.
Equations (2.1.7) represents the trade-off between non-durable consumption and leisure.
Equation (2.1.8) represents the trade-off between non-durable and durable goods. Equation
(2.1.9) represents the trade-off between non-durable consumption and bond holdings.
2.2 Firms
There are two types of firms: a continuum of non-durable goods producers and a continuum
of durable goods producers. Non-durable goods firms set their prices a` la Calvo while durable
goods firms can adjust their prices frictionlessly every period. These intermediate goods firms
are competitive in the factor market, and take factor prices as given. I allow the factors to
move freely within and between sectors.
2.2.1 Non-durable goods firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms in the non-durable goods sector
indexed by f ∈ (0, 1) that sell non-durable goods to final goods producers. They set a price
Pc,t (f) subject to a Calvo price setting. In each period, a fraction 1 − θc of the firms in
this sector reoptimize their prices regardless of the time of their last price adjustment. The
remaining fraction θc of the firms use the same price as in the previous period.
The demand faced by each firm depends on the price of its product and the total demand
for non-durable goods
Ct(f) =
(
Pc,t (f)
Pc,t
)−ε
Ct, (2.2.1.1)
where Ct =
[∫ 1
0
Ct(f)
ε−1
ε df
] ε
ε−1
is the consumption aggregator, and Pc,t =
[∫ 1
0
Pc,t (f)
1−ε df
] 1
1−ε
represents the price index for non-durable goods.
Production requires labor input
Ct(f) = (Kc,t(f))
α(AtLc,t(f))
1−α, (2.2.1.2)
where At denotes the aggregate productivity shock which has the following law of motion:
At = At−1ega,t (2.2.1.3)
ga,t = ρaga,t−1 + ηat (2.2.1.4)
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where ηat ∼ N(0, σa).
A non-durable good producer f chooses P ∗c,t(f) so as to maximize its discounted profit,
max
P ∗c,t(f)
∞∑
j=0
(βθc)
j Et
Λt+j
Pc,t+j
[Pc,t+j (f)Ct+j(f)−Wt+jLc,t+j(f)−Rc,t+jKc,t+j(f)]
subject to the demand for its product (2.2.1.1) and production function (2.2.1.2), where Λt+j
denotes the marginal utility of consumption for period t+ j.
The first-order conditions are,
Wt = MCc,tK
α
c,t(1− α)(AtLc,t)−αAt (13)
Rc,t = MCc,tK
(α−1)
c,t (α)(AtLc,t)
(1−α) (14)
P ∗c,t (f) =
ε
ε− 1
∑∞
j=0 (βθc)
j EtΛt+jMCc,t+j
(
1
Pc,t+j
)1−ε
Ct+j∑∞
j=0 (βθc)
j EtΛt+j
(
1
Pc,t+j
)1−ε
Ct+j
, (15)
where MCc,t is the marginal cost in the non-durable goods sector. The non-durable price
index is written as,
Pc,t =
[
(1− θc)P ∗1−εc,t + θcP 1−εc,t−1
] 1
1−ε . (2.2.1.6)
2.2.2 Durable goods firms
In the durable goods sector, there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms,
and unlike the non-durable goods sector, durable goods firms reoptimize their prices every
period, and face identical linear production and demand.
A durable goods firm f chooses its price P ∗x,t(f) so as to maximize its current profit,
max
P ∗x,t(f)
Px,t(f)Xt(f)−WtLx,t(f)−Rx,tKx,t(f),
subject to the production function
Xt(f) = K
α
x,t(AtZtLx,t(f))
1−α, (2.2.2.1)
and the demand function
Xt(f) =
(
Px,t (f)
Px,t
)−ε
Xt, (2.2.2.2)
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where Xt =
[∫ 1
0
Xt(f)
ε−1
ε df
] ε
ε−1
, Px,t =
[∫ 1
0
Px,t (f)
1−ε df
] 1
1−ε
, and Zt is the relative price
shock and follows:
Zt = Zt−1egz,t (2.2.2.3)
gz,t = ρzgz,t−1 + ηzt (2.2.2.4)
where ηzt ∼ N(0, σz). Note that, in equilibrium,
1
Zt
=
Px,t
Pc,t
(2.2.2.5)
The first-order conditions are:
Wt = MCx,tK
α
x,t(1− α)(AtZtLx,t)−αAtZt (19)
Rx,t = MCx,tK
(α−1)
x,t (α)(AtZtLx,t)
(1−α) (20)
P ∗x,t(f) =
ε
ε− 1
Wt
AtZt
. (2.2.2.6)
where MCx,t is the marginal cost in the durable goods sector.
2.3 Monetary policy and market clearing
The central bank follows the Taylor rule by adjusting the nominal interest rate in response
to changes in inflation and the output gap.3 We allow the monetary authority to partially
adjust toward the optimal interest target.
Rt = R
ρr
t−1(pit)
(1−ρr)φpi(Yt)(1−ρr)φyrt . (2.3.1)
where ρr determines the degree of interest rate smoothing and 
r
t is an i.i.d. monetary policy
shock such that rt ∼ N(0, σr).
2.4 Market Clearing
Finally, the model is closed with market clearing conditions in the labor and goods markets.
The labor market equilibrium requires
Lt = Lc,t + Lx,t. (2.4.1)
3Inflation is defined as a weighted average of nondurable goods inflation and durable goods inflation,
pit =
C
Y pict +
X
Y pixt.
9
and the goods market equilibrium requires that
Yt = Ct +Xt. (2.4.2)
The de-trended model and the corresponding log-linear equations can be found in the
appendix.
3 Calibration and Results
Table 1: Parameter values in the benchmark model
Parameter Value Interpretation
ν 0.33 inverse of labor supply elasticity
β 0.99 quarterly discount rate
ψc 0.75 utility weight on nondurables
ψd 0.25 utility weight on durables
θc 0.67 probability of not reoptimizing price
θx 0 perfectly flexible price
δ 0.025 quarterly durable depreciation rate
ρr 0.6 interest rate smoothing
φpi 1.5 interest rate response to inflation
φy 0.5 interest rate response to output gap
Notes: The calibration value of the parameters in the benchmark model.
Most of the parameter values are taken from BHK (2007). We set the subjective discount
factor, β, equal to 0.99, and the inverse of the Frisch labor-supply elasticity, ν, equals 0.33.
The depreciation rate of durable goods, δ, is 0.025 which implies an annual depreciation rate
of 10%. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ, and the intratemporal elasticity of
substitution between durables and non-durables, ρ, are both set equal to 1. The probability
that a firm in the non-durable goods sector cannot reoptimize its price in any given period,
θc, is set to 2/3. We assume that the monetary authority partially adjusts its policy rate
toward the optimal interest target, and set ρr = 0.6. Following the literature, we set φy = 0.5
and φpi = 1.5. The latter implies that the monetary policy rate responds more than one-for-
one to changes in inflation, and this ensures a unique equilibrium. Table 1 summarizes the
parameter values.
Throughout the section, we focus on the responses of non-durable goods consumption,
durable goods consumption and aggregate production to a contractionary monetary pol-
icy shock as in the literature. We first show that there is a co-movement problem be-
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tween durables and non-durables as pointed out by BHK when the preferences are separable
between the consumption composite and leisure. We then show that we can resolve the
co-movement problem when we have non-separable preferences between the consumption
composite and leisure which are the augmented GHH preferences. For these two cases, we
set γ = 0 and γ = 1, respectively, and the results can be found in Figure 1.
To obtain the intuition of the mechanism between these two preferences, let us look at the
case where γ = 1. When γ = σ = ρ = 1, Bt = Ht = C
ψc
t D
ψd
t and the period utility becomes
U(Ct, Dt, Lt, Ht) = logC
ψc
t D
ψd
t + log(1 − ltφL1+νt ) which is the same class of preferences as
discussed in BHK. Equation (2.1.6) becomes λt = −gt ltV −1φL1+νt . Equation (2.1.5) can be
simplified as Λt =
ψc
Ct
. Combining (2.1.5) and (2.1.7), we obtain the labor-leisure condition
φ(1 + ν)Lνt
1− φL1+ν =
Wt
Pc,t
ψcC
−1
t =
ε− 1
ε
AtZt
Px,t
Pc,t
ψcC
−1
t . (3.1)
The second equality follows by substituting out Wt using the price of durable goods, Px,t =
ε
ε−1
Wt
AtZt
. Moreover, by plugging λt and Λt into equation (2.1.8), we obtain ψcC
−1
t
Px,t
Pc,t
=
ψd
g
t
1
Dt
+ βψc(1− δ)EtC−1t+1 Px,t+1Pc,t+1 . With a small depreciation rate for durable goods, changes
in the stock of durable goods and its associated shadow value after a temporary policy shock
are small, inducing only a small change in ψcC
−1
t
Px,t
Pc,t
. Since the right-hand side of equation
(3.1) changes little in response to the monetary policy shock, aggregate labor hours remain
relatively constant. Therefore any fall in non-durable production is associated with a rise
in durable production, and the separable reference has difficulty generating co-movement
between durables and nondurables.
Next, when γ = 0 and ρ = σ = 1, we obtain the augmented GHH preferences and
the period utility becomes U(Ct, Dt, Lt, Ht) = log(C
ψc
t D
ψd
t − ltφhL1+νt ) where Ht = Ht−1 =
H = constant and φh = φH. If we revisit the leisure labor choice condition, equation
(2.1.7) now becomes φ(1 + ν)Lνt =
Wt
Pc,t
ψc
Bt
Ct
. Compared to the separable preferences, the
fall in non-durable goods consumption now induces a smaller wealth effect on labor supply
as Dt remains relatively constant and the rise in
Bt
Ct
= (Dt
Ct
)1−ψc is smaller than the rise
in C−1t following the contractionary policy shocks.
4’5 With a smaller wealth effect on the
labor supply decision, aggregate labor hours fall following a contractionary policy shock and
4We refer to this as the augmented GHH labor-leisure condition. Unlike the typical GHH preference
which only features non-durable goods consumption and induces labor supply depending only on the real
wage, here labor supply depends on both the real wage and the fraction of the composite consumption
to non-durable goods consumption. In the extreme case, where the composite consumption features only
nondurable goods consumption (i.e., ψc = 1), we get back the typical labor leisure choice under the standard
GHH preferences φ(1 + ν)Lνt =
Wt
Pc,t
. In that case, there is no wealth effect associated with labor supply
decisions.
5The wealth effect is determined by the share of non-durable consumption over the composite consump-
tion. As the share of non-durable consumption increases, the wealth effect decreases.
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therefore allow us to solve the co-movement problem between durables and non-durables.
In response to a contractionary policy shock, we observe a fall in both non-durables and
durables, and aggregate output falls. This is the resolution of the co-movement puzzle.
The JR preferences nest the KPR and GHH utility functions as special cases. From
our discussion above, for a small value of γ, the JR preference is able to generate a fall
in aggregate labor hours following a contractionary policy shock which enables our models
to generate a fall in both the durable and non-durable goods sector and thus solves the
co-movement puzzle.6
Fig. 2 shows the labor market equilibrium under both the separable preferences and the
non-separable preferences. Under separable preferences, the wealth effect and the substitu-
tion effects are roughly canceled out following the policy shocks, while under non-separable
preferences, the substitution effects are larger than the wealth effect which leads to a fall in
aggregate labor hours following a fall in the real wage in response to a contractionary policy
shock.
Although our model can successfully resolve the co-movement puzzle, the fall in non-
durables is larger than the fall in durables, which is inconsistent with the empirical finding
that durables are more interest rate sensitive than nondurables. To reconcile this inconsis-
tency between the model’s prediction and the empirical findings, we add in the habit forma-
tion for non-durable consumption. In particular, Bt = (Ct − hbCt − 1)ψc Dψdt and 0 ≤ hb ≤ 1
which is the parameter governing habit persistence. The introduction of habit formation al-
ters the propagation of policy shocks as the household dislikes large and rapid changes in
non-durable goods consumption and therefore mitigates the initial fall in non-durables con-
sumption which allows our model to generate a more interest rate sensitive durable goods
response than non-durables and is consistent with the empirical findings.
4 Alternative Specifications
While several papers have used various channels in accounting for the co-movement puzzle,
the existing literature lacks a formal comparison between competing alternatives using US
data. We compare the explanatory power of our baseline model with augmented GHH
preferences with two alternative channels in the literature. To this end, we extend the
baseline BHK model in two different ways. First, following Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006), we
introduce nominal wage rigidities and durable goods adjustment costs (Model 1). Second, in
the spirit of Tsai (2010), we introduce a working capital channel in both durable and non-
durable goods production and internal habit formation in non-durable goods consumption
6For any value of γ ∈ (0, 0.4), the JR preference is able to resolve the puzzle.
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(Model 2). Since the two extensions are well-known in the literature, here we only highlight
the key equations in each model.
4.1 Model 1: Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006)
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006) introduces nominal wage stickiness in the standard sticky price
model of BHK to resolve the co-movement puzzle. Households have monopoly power over
labor supply allowing for sticky nominal wages a` la Calvo (1983). Hence the wage is set
according to the following equation:
Wˆt =
β
1 + β
Wˆt+1 +
1
1 + β
Wˆt−1 +
β
1 + β
pˆit+1 +
(1− θwβ)(1− θw)
θw
[
Wˆ ht − Wˆt
]
(4.1.1)
where (1− θw) denotes the fraction of households that adjust their wage at time t and Wˆ ht
is the marginal rate of substitution. Furthermore, to smooth the behavior of durable goods
consumption, we add adjustment costs in the household budget constraint along the lines of
Engel and Wang (2007):
Pc,tCt +Px,tXt +Px,t
[
1
2
φ1
(Xt − δDt−1)2
Dt−1
]
≤ WtNt + Πt +Tt +St−1− St
Rt
, t = 0, 1, .. (4.1.2)
where φ1 is the adjustment cost parameter. The rest of the model is the same as benchmark
setting. The details of the linearized model are given in the appendix.
4.2 Model 2: Tsai (2010)
A recent paper by Tsai (2010) explores the role of financial frictions as a possible solution
to the co-movement puzzle. He extends the basic BHK model to include a working capital
channel to both the durable and non-durable sectors which imposes a constraint on the firms
to borrow in advance in order to pay wages. The log-linearized marginal cost becomes:
MˆCt = Wˆt + Rˆt − Aˆt (4.2.1)
In addition, he adds habit formation in non-durable consumption to induce sluggish behavior
in non-durables after a monetary policy shock. The new log-linearized Euler equation for
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non-durable consumption becomes:
Λˆt =
(
1− σ
1− hβ
)[
Bˆt − hβEtBˆt+1
]
− 1
(1− hβ)(1− h)
[
Cˆt − hCˆt−1
]
+
hβ
(1− bβ)(1− b)Et(Cˆt+1−bCˆt)+
1
(1− βh)
(
gt − βhEtgt+1
)
(4.2.2)
Again, please see the appendix for the rest of the linearized model.
5 Bayesian Estimation
In this section we describe the data, estimation methodology and the prior distributions of
the parameters for all three model specifications.
5.1 Data and Methodology
Implementation of the Bayesian estimation requires several steps. The first step is writing
the solution to the general equilibrium model in state-space representation:
xt+1 = h(xt) + ηt+1, (5.1.1)
yt = g(xt) + χut, (5.1.2)
where xt is a vector of state (both predetermined and endogenous) and control variables
and yt defines the vector of observables. t and ut are the vectors of structural shocks and
measurement errors, respectively, and are distributed as N(0, I); and h(x), g(x), η, χ are
functions of deep parameters of the model. The second step involves the formulation of the
likelihood function of the solution system using the Kalman filter. The third step combines
the likelihood function with the priors for the parameters to form the posterior density func-
tion. Since the posterior distribution is nonlinear and a complicated function of the deep
parameters, the final step involves computing it using sampling-like methods such as the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.7
The sample period ranges from 1966:02 to 2003:01, at a quarterly frequency. Our ob-
servables consist of five macro-economic time series: (i) real durable goods consumption,
7An and Schorfheide (2007) provide a detailed summary of applications of Bayesian methods in dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models. We use DYNARE to conduct all the estimations. The replication
files are available on request.
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(ii) real non-durable goods consumption, (iii) the relative price of non-durables to durables,
(iv) hours worked, and (v) a short-term interest rate. The first three series are taken from
the US Department of Commerce - Bureau of Economic Analysis databank. Both durable
and non-durable goods consumption expenditures are deflated by their respective price de-
flators to obtain real variables. The hours data series is taken from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS). Hours (hours and hourly compensation for the NFB sector for all persons)
are adjusted to take into account the limited coverage of the NFB sector compared to GDP
(the index of average hours for the NFB sector is multiplied by the Civilian Employment
(16 years and over). The short-term interest rate is the Federal Funds Rate. All series are
seasonally adjusted. Our demeaned set of observable variables is given by:
Zt = [lNt, dlCt, dlDt, lRt, dlPt]
′
where l and dl stand for the log and log difference, respectively. Figure (3) plots the set of
observables. The corresponding log-linearized measurement equations, mapping the observ-
ables and transformed variables, are as follows:
lNt
dlCt
dlXt
Rt
dlPt
 =

nˆt
(cˆt − cˆt−1)
(xˆt − xˆt−1)
rˆt
(pˆc,t − pˆx,t)− (pˆc,t−1 − pˆx,t−1)
+

0
gˆa,t
gˆa,t + gˆz,t
0
gˆz,t

5.2 Priors
We calibrate some of the deep parameters which are difficult to identify. We set the quarterly
depreciation rate and discount rate to 0.025 and 0.99, respectively. Following Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe (2008), the intertemporal elasticity of substitution parameter is set at 1. Finally,
the steady state markup is set at 6. The rest of the parameters are estimated and Table 2
lists their prior distributions.
The prior distribution of the standard deviations of the two technology shocks and two
preference shocks are assumed to follow Inverse Gamma distributions with means of 0.5 and
2.0, respectively. We assume that the prior mean of the standard deviation of the monetary
policy shock is 0.1 which is consistent with other related studies. All the AR(1) coefficients
are assumed to follow a Beta distribution with mean 0.75 and standard error 0.1.
The habit persistence parameter hb is assumed to follow a Beta distribution with mean
0.7 and standard error 0.1. There is no clear consensus on the value of the labor elasticity
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in the existing literature. While micro studies indicate that the value is less than 0.5, macro
studies with log separable (in consumption and leisure) preferences indicate that the value
varies between 1/3 and 1. Recently, studies with non-separable preferences have implied a
much higher value for this parameter. For example, Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) calibrate
it at 2.5, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2008) estimate it at 6.25; and Monacelli and Perotti
(2006) calibrate it at 1.25. Inspired by these studies, we assume ν has a prior mean of 0.66
which implies a value for the Frisch elasticity of 1.5 in our baseline model. Following Smets
and Wouters (2007) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), the adjustment cost
parameter φ1 is set at 4 with a standard error of 1.5.
Moving to the parameters describing the nominal rigidities, we set the Calvo probabili-
ties at 0.66 for both the wage and price rigidities, with a standard error of around 0.10. This
implies that the average durations of both the price and wage contracts are approximately
around three quarters. Finally, the monetary policy shock parameters are set at standard
calibration values. The coefficients for inflation and the output gap follow Normal distri-
butions with means of 1.7 and 0.13 and standard errors of 0.3 and 0.05, respectively. The
interest rate smoothing parameter is assumed to have a mean of 0.6 and a standard error of
0.20.
6 Results
6.1 Posterior Estimates
Table 3 reports the posterior estimates of all the parameters from the three specifications:
baseline, Model 1 and Model 2. The posterior mean, and 5th and 95th percentiles of the
posterior distribution of the parameters are obtained through the Metropolis-Hastings sam-
pling algorithm. The results are based on 100,000 draws from the posterior distribution.8
The plots of the prior and posterior distributions of the parameter estimates under all the
models are given in Figures (4)-(6).
All the parameters are estimated to be significantly different from zero. Moreover, most
of the behavioral parameter estimates are similar across the three model specifications. The
key findings are as follows. Focusing on the preference parameters of the baseline model,
the estimated value of the labor elasticity parameter ν is 0.74 which implies that the Frisch
elasticity is around 1.35. This value is higher than 1.00 as implied by the other two model
specifications. Both the baseline and Model 2 specifications estimate the intermediate habit
persistence hb (0.69 and 0.50, respectively) which is consistent with Smets and Wouters
8We run two chains of the MH algorithm, each with 100,000 draws. The acceptance rate is around 0.25.
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(2007).
The estimate of the price stickiness parameter θc in the baseline case is around 0.87 and
is quite close to the other two estimates (0.89, Model 1; 0.88, Model 2). This implies that
the average duration of the price contract in all the three models is around 7.69 quarters,
which is much longer than the 3 quarters found in Smets and Wouters (2007). Furthermore,
the average duration of the wage contract implied by Model 1 is 2.56 (θw = 0.61) which is
consistent with other related studies (Smets and Wouters (2007), Justiniano, Primiceri and
Tambalotti (2010, 2011)). Finally, the elasticity of the cost of changing the stock of durables
φ1 in Model 1 is estimated to be higher than its prior mean, around 5.52, implying an even
slower response of the stock of durables to any exogenous shocks.
Turning to the estimates of the parameters governing the exogenous shocks, a few points
are worth mentioning. First, both the intratemporal preference shocks and relative price
shocks are estimated to be very persistent in all three specifications. Second, the absence
of hump-shaped endogenous dynamics induced by internal habits is compensated by more
persistent and volatile intertemporal preference shocks in Model 1. Third, while the estimate
of the standard deviation of the relative price shock in the baseline case is around 4.83 and
is higher than the estimates in other specifications, that of the neutral technology shock in
the baseline model is somewhat lower than that in the other two models. The small wealth
effect implied by the augmented GHH preferences induces a strong transmission mechanism
for the relative price shocks.9 Finally, the estimated means of the standard deviation of the
monetary policy shocks are similar in all three cases (0.33, baseline; 0.31, Model 1; 0.44,
Model 2).
The estimate of the interest rate smoothing parameter (0.90) is somewhat higher in the
baseline model compared to the other two models (0.53, 0.63), indicating a considerable de-
gree of smoothing. The mean of the long-run reaction coefficient to inflation is comparable
across the models. However, the authorities do not appear to react very strongly to the
output gap level in the short-run in any of the models.
6.2 Impulse Responses
Recall that our estimation exercise has two goals: to examine how well each estimated model
can (i) explain the co-movement puzzle, and (ii) fit the data. To pursue the first goal, we
plot the impulse responses of key variables to a (one standard deviation) monetary policy
shock computed at the estimated posterior means of the parameters as given in Figure (7).
9A wealth of the literature, such as GHH (1998) and Raffo (2009), establish that the GHH preferences
facilitate strong propagation of investment-specific technology shocks that are analogous to relative price
shocks in this paper.
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We observe that all three estimated models can resolve the co-movement puzzle. However,
the internal propagation mechanisms differ across the three models.
In the baseline case, aggregate hours fall due to the small wealth effect on labor sup-
ply after a contractionary monetary policy shock (solid line in Figure (7)). This induces a
fall in both durable and non-durable production, confirming our intuition from the calibra-
tion exercise in Section (2). Furthermore, internal habit persistence generates hump-shaped
responses in non-durable consumption, making it less interest-sensitive than durable con-
sumption which is consistent with the empirical VAR findings.
Model 1 introduces nominal wage stickiness in the standard sticky price model as in
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006). Given that labor is the only input, stickiness in nominal wages
induces stickiness in the durable goods prices. Hence, durable goods producers have little
incentive to adjust their prices as long as the wages are sticky. This causes the aggregate
labor, aggregate production, non-durables and durables to fall after a contractionary policy
shock (dashed-dot line in Figure (7)). Furthermore, the introduction of adjustment costs
prevents the responses of durable goods consumption from moving in the opposite direction
after the initial fall on impact.
Finally Model 2 explores the role of the financial frictions as in Tsai (2010). The intro-
duction of a working capital channel imposes the firms to borrow in advance in order to pay
wages. After a contractionary monetary policy shock, the marginal cost rises, discouraging
production in both the durable and non-durable goods sectors, and thereby inducing a fall in
the aggregate labor. Finally, the consumption smoothing motive implied by habit formation
dampens the response of non-durable goods consumption to the shock (dashed-star line in
Figure (7)).
6.3 Model Fit
In this section, we achieve the second goal of the estimation exercise by comparing the models’
fit. One advantage of Bayesian analysis is that it can be employed to assess the relative
plausibility of alternative model specifications by comparing the log marginal likelihood.10
Table 4 reports the out-of-sample forecasts under each specification. The marginal likelihoods
are based on Geweke’s Harmonic Mean Estimator. Column 3 reports Bayes’ factor which is
the difference between the log marginal likelihood in alternative cases and the baseline case.
The smaller is the number, the stronger is the evidence in favor of the baseline case.
10This tool has been successfully used to make comparisons across models in Lubik and Schorfheide (2006),
Rabanal and Tuesta (2010), Smets and Wouters (2007) and Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010).
Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2001) argue that Bayesian inference based on marginal likelihood comparisons
across models is valid even if the models are nonnested, misspecified and nonlinear.
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It is quite evident that the data strongly favor Model 2 over all the specifications followed
by Model 1. The marginal log-likelihood under Model 1 and Model 2 increases by 121 and
214, respectively, compared to the baseline model, which means that priors that favor the
baseline model over Model 1 and Model 2 by factors of 7.6× 1052 and 8.6× 1092 are needed
in order to accept it after observing the data. These factors are very high, and so the data
strongly reject the baseline model compared to the other cases.
In a nutshell, there are key structural differences across the three models that affect the
reduced form dynamics of durable consumption, non-durable consumption, hours, inflation
and the interest rate and hence the models’ overall fit to the actual data. Our findings suggest
that Model 2 with a working capital channel not only successfully resolves the co-movement
puzzle, but also outperforms the other two specifications in fitting the data.
7 Conclusion
We propose a new mechanism: non-separable preferences with a small wealth effect on labor
hours to resolve the negative co-movement puzzle in outputs across durable and non-durable
sectors as pointed out by BHK. Following a contractionary monetary policy shock, aggregate
labor declines due to the small wealth effect, inducing a simultaneous fall in both durable and
non-durable goods production. Next, we use a Bayesian approach and five macroeconomic
time-series that are key to our study to estimate and compare our model’s performance with
two alternative models that can simultaneously resolve the puzzle. Using marginal likelihood
as a model comparison device, we find that our model performs worse than Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2006) and Tsai (2010). In particular, Tsai (2010) outperforms all other specifications
in fitting the data.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
A Household’s problem
Utility function is given by:
U(Ct, Dt, Nt) = 
g
t
[
(Bt)− ltφN1+νt Ht
]
s.t.
Ht = H
(1−γ)
t−1 (Bt)
γ
where Bt = (Ct − hbCt − 1)ψc Dψdt and gt , lt are preference shock and labor-preference shock
respectively. Then the household optimization problem is:
Max
∑
βt
U(Ct, Dt, Nt)
1−σ
1− σ
s.t.
Pc,tCt + Px,tXt + Px,t
[
1
2
φ1
(Xt − δDt−1)2
Dt−1
]
≤ WtNt + Πt + Tt + St−1 − St
Rt
, t = 0, 1, .. (1)
Ht = H
(1−γ)
t−1 (Bt)
γ (2)
Dt = (1− δ)Dt−1 +Xt (3)
Let Λt,Ωt,Ξt represent the langrangian multipliers for constraints (1) (2) and (3) respectively.
The household foc with respect to Ct, Xt, Dt, Nt, Ht are:
Λt = ψcU
−σ
t
Bt
(Ct − hbCt−1)
g
t−hbβψcEt
[
U−σt+1
g
t+1
] Bt+1
(Ct+1 − hbCt)+γψcΩtH
1−γ
t−1 (Bt)
γ−1 Bt
(Ct − hbCt−1)
− hbβγψcEt
[
Ωt+1 (Bt+1)
γ−1]H1−γt Bt+1(Ct+1 − hbCt) (4)
Λt
Px,t
Pc,t
+ Λt
Px,t
Pc,t
φ1
(Xt − δDt−1)
Dt−1
= Ξt (5)
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Ξt − β(1− δ)EtΞt+1 = ψdU−σt
Bt
Dt
gt + γψdΩtH
(1−γ)
t−1
(Bt)
γ
Dt
+ Λt
Px,t
Pc,t
[
φ1δ
(Xt − δDt−1)
Dt−1
+
φ1
2
(Xt − δDt−1)2
D2t−1
]
(6)
U−σt φ(1 + ν)N
ν
t Ht
g
t 
l
t = Λt
Wt
Pc,t
(7)
Ωt + U
−σ
t φN
1+ν
t 
g
t 
l
t = β(1− γ)EtΩt+1 (Bt+1)γ H−γt (8)
Detrend: To detrend our model, let Bt = btAtZ
ϕd
t , Ht = htAtZ
ϕd
t ,
Bt
Ct
=
(
bt
ct
)
(Zt)
ϕd ,
Bt
Dt
=
(
bt
dt
)(
1
Zt
)ϕc
, U (.)−σ = (At)
−σ (Zt)
ϕd(−σ) u (.)−σ, Λt = (At)
−σ (Zt)
ϕd(1−σ) λt, Ωt =
(AtZ
ϕd
t )
−σ ωt, Ξt = ξt (At)
−σ (Zt)
ϕd(1−σ)−1 Wt = Atwt, PxtPct =
1
Zt
pxt
pct
, then we can have the
following equations.
λt = ψcu
−σ
t
bt
(ct − hbct−1/ga,t)
g
t − hbβψcEt
[
u−σt+1g
−σ
a,t+1g
ψd(1−σ)
z,t+1 
g
t+1
] bt+1
(ct+1 − hbct/ga,t+1)
+γψcωt
h1−γt−1 b
γ
t
(ct − hbct−1/ga,t)
[
ga,tg
ψd
z,t
]γ−1
−hbβγψcωt+1 b
γ
t+1h
1−γ
t
(ct+1 − hbct/ga,t+1)g
−σ+γ−1
a,t+1 (g
ψd
z,t+1)
1−σ+γ−1
(D.1)
λt
px,t
pc,t
+ λt
px,t
pc,t
φ1
(ga,tgz,txt − δdt−1)
dt−1
= ξt (D.2)
ξt−λtpx,t
pc,t
[
φ1(ga,tgz,txt − δdt−1) δ
dt−1
+
1
2
φ1 (ga,tgz,txt − δdt−1)2 1
d2t−1
]
−β(1−δ)Etξt+1g−σa,t+1gψd(1−σ)−1z,t+1
= ψdu
−σ
t
bt
dt
gt + γψdωth
(1−γ)
t−1
(bt)
γ
dt
[ga,tg
ψd
z,t ]
γ−1 (D.3)
u−σt φ(1 + ν)N
ν
t ht
g
t 
l
t = λt
wt
Pc,t
(D.4)
ωt + u
−σ
t φN
1+ν
t 
g
t 
l
t = β(1− γ)Etωt+1(ga,t+1gψdz,t+1)γ−σ (bt+1)γ h−γt (D.5)
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Non-durable goods firms optimization problem gives:
MCc,t =
Wt
At
(A.1)
Durable goods firms optimization problem gives:
MCx,t =
Wt
ZtAt
(A.2)
MCx,t = Px,t (A.3)
Combining (A.1) and (A.2):
MCx,t
MCc,t
=
1
Zt
=
Px,t
Pc,t
Steady state:
From (D.5),
ω =
u−σφN1+ν
β(1− γ)− 1 (ss.1)
From D.1,
λ =
ψcu
−σb
c(1− hb)(1− βhb)
[
1 +
γφN1+ν
β(1− γ)− 1
]
(ss.2)
From D.2,
λ = ξ (ss.3)
From D.3 and ss.1
ξ [1− β(1− δ)] = ψdu−σ b
d
[
1 +
γφN1+ν
β(1− γ)− 1
]
(ss.4)
From ss.2, ss.3 and ss.4,
ψc =
c/d
1−β(1−δ)
1−βhb
1−hb +
c/d
1−β(1−δ)
From D.4 and ss.4
φ =
ψdb/d
1−β(1−δ)
N1+ν
[
(1+ν)h/N
(−1)/ − ψd(b/d)γ(1−β(1−δ))(β(1−γ)−1)
]
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Log-linearize:
(1− βhb)λˆt =
(β(1− γ)− 1)
(β(1− γ)− 1) + γφN1+ν
[
−σuˆt + bˆt − 1
1− hb
(cˆt − hbcˆt−1 + hbgˆa,t) + ˆgt
]
− hbβ(β(1− γ)− 1)
(β(1− γ)− 1) + γφN1+ν
[
−σuˆt+1 − σgˆa,t+1 + ψd(1− σ)gˆz,t+1 + bˆt+1 −
1
1− hb
(cˆt+1 − hbcˆt + hbgˆa,t+1) + ˆgt+1
]
+
γφN1+ν
β(1− γ)− 1 + γφN1+ν
[
ωˆt + (1− γ)hˆt−1 + γbˆt − 1
1− hb
(cˆt − hbcˆt−1 + hbgˆa,t) + (γ − 1)(gˆa,t + ψdgˆz,t)
]
− hbβγφN
1+ν
β(1− γ)− 1 + γφN1+ν
[
ωˆt+1 + (1− γ)hˆt + γbˆt+1 − 1
1− hb
(cˆt+1 − hbcˆt + hbgˆa,t+1) + (−σ + γ − 1)gˆa,t+1 + (1− σ + γ − 1)ψdgˆz,t+1
]
(L.1)
λˆt + pˆx,t − pˆc,t + φ1δ(xˆt − dˆt−1 + gˆa,t + gˆz,t) = ξˆt (L.2)
ξˆt − φ1δ2(xˆt − dˆt−1 + gˆa,t + gˆz,t)− β(1− δ)
[
ξˆt+1 − σgˆa,t+1 + (ψd(1− σ)− 1)gˆz,t+1
]
=
(1− β(1− δ))(β(1− γ)− 1)
(β(1− γ)− 1) + γφN1+ν (−σuˆt + bˆt − dˆt + ˆ
g
t )
+
(1− β(1− δ))γφN1+ν
(β(1− γ)− 1) + γφN1+ν
[
ωˆt + (1− γ)hˆt−1 + γbˆt − dˆt + (γ − 1)(gˆa,t + ψdgˆz,t)
]
(L.3)
1
β(1− γ)
[
ωˆt + (β(1− γ)− 1)(−σuˆt + (1 + ν)Nˆt + ˆgt + ˆlt)
]
= ωˆt+1 + (γ − σ)(gˆa,t+1 + ψdgˆz,t+1) + γ(bˆt+1 − hˆt) (L.4)
λˆt + wˆt − pˆc,t = −σuˆt + νNˆt + hˆt + ˆgt + ˆlt (L.5)
hˆt = (1− γ)hˆt−1 + γbˆt + (γ − 1)(gˆa,t + φdgˆz,t) (L.6)
bˆt =
ψc
1− hb
(cˆt − hbcˆt−1 + hbgˆa,t) + ψddˆt (L.7)
uˆt =
1
(1− φN1+ν)
[
bˆt − φN1+ν((1 + ν)Nˆt + hˆ+ ˆlt)
]
(L.8)
Alternative Specifications:
• Baseline (Augmented GHH): φ1 = 0, γ = 0
• Model 1: hb = 0, γ = 1
• Model 2: γ = 1, φ1 = 0
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Table 2: Priors of structural parameters
Parameter Description Distribution Mean Std. Dev
ν inverse of Frisch elasticity Normal 0.66 0.10
hb habit parameter Beta 0.70 0.10
φ1 adjustment cost Normal 4.00 1.5
θc probability of not optimizing prices Beta 0.66 0.10
θw probability of not optimizing wages Beta 0.66 0.10
φpi Taylor rule response to inflation Normal 1.70 0.3
φy Taylor rule response to output Normal 0.13 0.05
ρr Taylor rule inertia Beta 0.6 0.20
ρa persistence of productivity shock Beta 0.75 0.1
ρg persistence of preference shock Beta 0.75 0.1
ρl persistence of labor supply shock Beta 0.75 0.1
ρv persistence of relative price shock Beta 0.75 0.1
σa s.d. of productivity shock Inverse Gamma 0.50 1.00
σg s.d. of preference shock Inverse Gamma 2.00 1.00
σl s.d. of labor supply shock Inverse Gamma 2.00 1.00
σv s.d. of relative price shock Inverse Gamma 0.50 1.00
σr s.d. of monetary policy shock Inverse Gamma 0.10 1.00
Notes: This table lists the description and prior distributions of the structural parameters. The parameters
θw and h are only used in Model 1 and Model 2 respectively. All the other parameters are used in all the
three models.
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Table 3: Posterior of structural parameters
Baseline Model 1 (CF) Model 2 (Tsai)
Parameters Mean 90% interval Mean 90% interval Mean 90% interval
ν 0.74 [0.67,0.80] 0.96 [0.82,1.10] 0.99 [0.86, 1.12]
hb 0.69 [0.67,0.72] - - 0.50 [0.42,0.58]
θc 0.87 [0.86,0.87] 0.89 [0.88,0.91] 0.88 [0.84, 0.92]
θw - - 0.61 [0.60,0.62] - -
φ1 - - 5.52 [4.20,6.75] - -
φpi 1.02 [1.00,1.05] 1.19 [1.16, 1.23] 1.43 [1.17,1.70]
φy 0.35 [0.29,0.41] 0.04 [0.03, 0.06] 0.006 [0.0010, 0.01]
ρr 0.90 [0.89,0.92] 0.53 [0.50,0.56] 0.63 [0.57,0.69]
ρa 0.73 [0.68,0.77] 0.16 [0.11,0.20] 0.15 [0.11,0.18]
ρg 0.61 [0.55,0.68] 0.99 [0.98,0.99] 0.89 [0.82, 0.96]
ρl 0.97 [0.96,0.98] 0.83 [0.79, 0.85] 0.98 [0.96,0.99]
ρv 0.97 [0.96,0.97] 0.98 [0.98,0.99] 0.95 [0.93,0.97]
σa 0.33 [0.28,0.37] 1.12 [1.01,1.23] 1.11 [1.00,1.22]
σv 4.83 [4.37,5.30] 0.12 [0.10, 0.13] 0.12 [0.10,0.14]
σg 2.62 [2.28,2.95] 7.58 [3.97,11.22] 1.58 [1.17,2.01]
σr 0.33 [0.28,0.37] 0.31 [0.27, 0.34] 0.44 [0.36,0.52]
σl 0.58 [0.48,0.67] 2.12 [1.86,2.37] 1.15 [1.02,1.28]
Notes: This table lists the prior distributions of the structural parameters in all the three estimated models:
baseline, Model 1 and Model 2. The two numbers in the parentheses are the 90% confidence intervals.
Table 4: Marginal Likelihood
Model Log Marginal Likelihood Bayes’ Factor
Baseline -1262.283 0
Model 1 -1140.516 121.767
Model 2 -1048.170 214.113
Notes: The table reports log marginal likelihoods from each model. The Bayes’ factor is given by calculating
the difference between log marginal likelihoods of the alternative specifications and the baseline specification.
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Figure 1: IRF from a unit contractionary monetary policy shock.
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Figure 3: Observables.
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Figure 4: Prior and posterior distributions under the baseline model.
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Figure 5: Prior and posterior distributions under Model 1.
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Figure 6: Prior and posterior distributions under Model 2.
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Figure 7: Estimated mean impulse responses from monetary policy shock.
Notes: Economic models’ responses to a one standard deviation contractionary monetary policy shock.
The estimated standard deviations of the monetary policy shock are 0.33, 0.31 and 0.44 for baseline, Model
1 and Model 2 specifications respectively. The impulse responses are computed at the posterior means of
the parameters obtained under the three specifications.
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